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INTRODUCTION
In the decades since World War II, the growing number of treaties, international tribunals, and international organizations1 has
transformed global legal institutions.2 For example, the European
Court of Justice now has controlling authority on many matters of European law in the legal systems and national courts of European
Union member states.3 In the United States, however, the Supreme
Court acts solely under constitutional authority, and the Constitution
in turn dictates the scope and authority of other sources of law.4 At
the same time, the Court increasingly confronts cases that foreign or
international courts have already—to some extent—addressed.5
When this occurs, it raises a crucial question: how much deference
should the U.S. Supreme Court give such decisions?
In a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon,6 the Court accorded “respectful consideration” to an International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on an issue nearly identical to
the one before the Court.7 However, the Court ultimately rejected
the ICJ’s ruling that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (the Vienna Convention) could override domestic procedural default rules. The Court instead held that suppression of evidence
1
See SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2006) (“The increasing
interaction of states and non-state actors across boundaries . . . necessitated the development of increasingly complex and sophisticated treaty regimes. . . . International organizations have continued to proliferate . . . .”).
2
See FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN & RICHARD J. WILSON, THE RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL
COMPANION TO CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 2 (1999).
3
See Stephen D. Krasner, The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, and International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1085 (2004) (“[T]he rulings of the European Court
of Justice have direct effect and supremacy in the legal systems of the [European Union]
member states. Thus, the member states of the EU are not juridically independent, even
though this loss of independence is the result of freely chosen commitments.”); cf. Jed
Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1981
(2004) (“Through their participation in the European Union, many European states today
have surrendered prerogatives and trappings of national sovereignty long considered
inviolable.”).
4
See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) (plurality opinion) (“The United States is
entirely a creature of the Constitution.”).
5
See Harold Hongju Koh, The Ninth Annual John W. Hager Lecture, The 2004
Term: The Supreme Court Meets International Law, in 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 2–4
(2004); Jenny S. Martinez, Enforcing the Decisions of International Tribunals in the U.S. Legal
System, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 877, 878 (2005) (“International cases have been on the
Supreme Court’s docket in an increasingly prominent way during the past few years.”).
6
126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
7
See id. at 2685.
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is not an appropriate remedy for Vienna Convention violations and
that regular state procedural default rules still apply in this context.8
In light of the Court’s decision in Sanchez-Llamas, what exactly does it
mean for the Court to grant “respectful consideration” toward ICJ decisions regarding the Vienna Convention?
This question is particularly pressing for three reasons. First, although there is significant controversy regarding the Court’s use of
foreign judgments to interpret the U.S. Constitution,9 there is much
less dispute regarding the use of foreign and international precedent
to interpret treaties.10 More specifically, there is a dearth of academic
discussion regarding the “respectful consideration” doctrine as currently applied to ICJ rulings.11 Second, the narrowness of the SanchezLlamas holding suggests that another Vienna Convention case could
soon come before the Supreme Court. By focusing on the remedies
available for a Vienna Convention violation, the Court’s holding in
Sanchez-Llamas remained narrow and sidestepped the central issue of
the judicial enforceability of Vienna Convention rights.12 As a result,
the Sanchez-Llamas holding may not provide adequate guidance to
lower courts,13 likely necessitating another ruling on claimants’ rights
under the Vienna Convention. Third, the recent appointments of
8

See id. at 2674, 2677–87.
See Susan L. Karamanian, Briefly Resuscitating the Great Writ: The International Court of
Justice and the U.S. Death Penalty, 69 ALB. L. REV. 745, 746–49 (2006) (“The debate de jour is
whether U.S. courts are authorized to cite to foreign court decisions or foreign opinion to
give meaning to the U.S. Constitution. . . . On the one hand are those who believe U.S.
courts should not consider foreign law in interpreting the Constitution. On the other
hand are those who recognize that foreign decisions may provide useful insight into certain aspects of the Constitution.”).
10
See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call
for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1936–37 (2005) (noting a lack of scholarly discussion
about the proper role that foreign decisions should play in domestic courts’ interpretation
of treaties); Melissa A. Waters, Treaty Dialogue in Sanchez-Llamas: Is Chief Justice Roberts a
Transnationalist, After All?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 89, 89 (2007) (“[D]ebate [over domestic use of foreign precedent] has focused almost exclusively on . . . the role of foreign and
international law in interpreting the U.S. Constitution.”).
11
See, e.g., Anthony N. Bishop, The Unenforceable Rights to Consular Notification and Access in the United States: What’s Changed Since the LaGrand Case?, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 20–24
(2002) (noting the Court’s “respectful consideration” doctrine briefly as part of a larger
discussion on consular relations). The Supreme Court’s deference to foreign courts—or
lack thereof—may also have a “trickle down” effect on state and lower federal courts. See
generally Mark Wendell DeLaquil, Foreign Law and Opinion in State Courts, 68 ALB. L. REV.
697 (2006) (discussing the frequent reluctance of state courts to incorporate international
law into their own rulings and interpretations). Though some articles have appropriately
discussed lower court application of “respectful consideration,” see, e.g., John R. Crook,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 214,
218–19 (2006), Sanchez-Llamas has now dated much of the existing legal scholarship.
12
This narrowness exemplifies the Court’s apparent preference for “judicial minimalism” in recent years. See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV.
125, 307–09 (2006) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
13
See id. at 311–12.
9
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Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito have renewed interest in the Court’s treatment of foreign decisions, as each has fervently opposed the practice of citation to foreign authority in the
constitutional context.14 Therefore, at this crucial juncture, the
Court’s “respectful consideration” doctrine merits examination to understand both its application thus far and its potential effect on American jurisprudence.
This Note argues that the doctrine of “respectful consideration”
has emerged as little more than a hollow acknowledgement of the ICJ
before the Court engages in its own independent interpretation of the
Vienna Convention. It further argues that, while the ICJ has no actual
legal authority to interpret the Vienna Convention from the U.S. domestic perspective, the Supreme Court should nonetheless treat ICJ
decisions with greater deference. Specifically, Justice Stephen
Breyer’s test from his Sanchez-Llamas dissent accords the proper level
of deference by permitting, in limited circumstances, the remedies of
suppression of the evidence and exceptions to state procedural default rules. By applying this test, the Court would respect the ICJ’s
expertise in interpreting the Vienna Convention, protect the national
interest in uniform treaty interpretation, and ensure security of American diplomats abroad. Additionally, Justice Breyer’s formulation of
“respectful consideration” in the Vienna Convention context can and
should serve as a blueprint for the Supreme Court in future treaty
interpretation cases.
Part I of this Note describes the roles of treaties and foreign case
law in U.S. courts and provides a brief history of the International
Court of Justice. Part II chronicles the history of the Vienna Convention as well as its recent treatment in both the Supreme Court and the
ICJ. Part III details the Court’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention in Sanchez-Llamas and the dissenting opinion of Justice Stephen
Breyer. Finally, Part IV evaluates the Sanchez-Llamas decision by considering the nature of “respectful consideration” in the Court’s jurisprudence and argues that the Sanchez-Llamas majority ignored
countervailing concerns that warrant greater deference toward ICJ
decisions.

14
During his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts argued that foreign precedent lacked accountability and was a means for a judge to “‘cloak his own views’” under
the guise of legitimate authority. See James W. Leary, Foreword, “Outsourcing Authority?”
Citation to Foreign Court Precedent in Domestic Jurisprudence, 69 ALB. L. REV. vii, viii (2006).
Justice Alito, at his own confirmation hearings, opined that it is neither “appropriate or
useful to look to foreign law in interpreting the provisions of our Constitution.” See id.
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A. Treaties in U.S. Courts
United States courts have long seemed to view treaties as both
fundamental and antithetical to American jurisprudence.15 The U.S.
Constitution states that, along with the Constitution and laws made in
pursuance thereof, treaties stand as the “Supreme Law of the land.”16
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has famously stated that
“[i]nternational law is part of our law”17 and integral to U.S. jurisprudence.18 However, the United States is a “dualist” legal system which
views domestic and international legal systems as distinct branches of
law.19 This is exemplified by a modern, judicially created distinction
between “non-self-executing” treaties, which require national legislation in order to be given legal effect,20 and “self-executing” treaties,
which are binding and enforceable domestic law without the need for
15
See Martinez, supra note 5, at 887 (“[T]hroughout its history, the United States has
demonstrated neither a consistent pattern of obedience and respect for international law
and decisions of international courts and tribunals, nor a consistent pattern of defiance
and disregard.”).
16
U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
17
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.”).
18
See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (“International law, in its widest and
most comprehensive sense—including not only questions of right between nations, governed by what has been appropriately called the law of nations; but also questions arising
under what is usually called private international law, or the conflict of laws, and concerning the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of
acts, private or public, done within the dominions of another nation—is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice, as often as such questions are presented in litigation between man and man . . . .”).
19
See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
63–64 (7th rev. ed. 1997); JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 74–115 (2004); Deena R. Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International Human Rights Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 505, 515 n.42 (2003) (“[T]he
United States functions on a dualist system, in which international law clearly forms a part
of the domestic legal system, but must be ratified and incorporated into domestic law in
order to be enforceable in U.S. courts.”). By contrast, in “monist” legal systems, international law is automatically part of a state’s domestic legal system and may be considered
superior to domestic law. See MALANCZUK, supra, at 63–64. Though this conceptual differentiation is helpful, nations often do not “neatly” divide into these two distinct categories
in practice. See id.
20
See MALANCZUK, supra note 19, at 67.
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implementing legislation.21 Though self-executing treaties were traditionally rare, they have greatly expanded in number over the past fifty
years. Currently, over four hundred treaties—both self-executing and
non-self-executing—are directly enforceable in the United States.22
Reasoning from constitutional authority, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that a federal statute enacted at a later time than a
conflicting treaty will override that treaty.23 This “later-in-time” rule
prioritizes national legislation over treaty law, effectively absolving
U.S. governmental actors of their treaty obligations if Congress enacts
subsequent domestic legislation.24 Despite this, whenever possible,
courts should interpret a statute and a treaty to give meaning to
both.25 Even if courts do construe a federal statute to control over a
treaty, the statute does not “extinguish” the United States’ international obligations under that treaty.26
B. Citation to Foreign Precedent in U.S. Courts
The American judiciary has also been hesitant to incorporate foreign precedent into its own legal system.27 However, in recent years
the Supreme Court has increasingly looked to foreign authorities
when resolving issues of constitutional interpretation,28 most notably
in such controversial constitutional cases as Lawrence v. Texas,29 Grutter

21

See MARTIN & WILSON, supra note 2, at 9.
Van Alstine, supra note 10, at 1892.
23
See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (“ ‘The treaty power, as expressed in the
Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the government or of its departments, and those arising
from the nature of the government itself and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in
the character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion
of the territory of the latter, without its consent.’ ” (quoting Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258,
267 (1890))).
24
See The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1870) (recognizing a “later in time
rule” under which a treaty can supersede a prior Congressional statute and a Congressional act can supersede a prior treaty); Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-inTime Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 334–39 (2005).
25
See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341–42 (1924).
26
See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 294 (2d
ed. 2006).
27
See Alex Glashausser, Difference and Deference in Treaty Interpretation, 50 VILL. L. REV.
25, 66 (2005) (“Compared with other domestic court systems, U.S. courts have given perhaps the least deference to the decisions of international tribunals . . . .”).
28
See Koh, supra note 5, at 5–6.
29
See 539 U.S. 558, 573, 576–77 (2003) (citing the European Court of Human Rights,
as well as the practices of other nations, which have held that homosexuals have the right
to engage in consensual sexual conduct).
22
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v. Bollinger,30 Atkins v. Virginia,31 and Roper v. Simmons.32 For example,
in Roper the Court considered foreign standards of decency in capital
punishment and ultimately found the juvenile death penalty
unconstitutional.33
The Court has also appeared somewhat reluctant to adopt international norms when interpreting key treaty provisions.34 Yet, similar
to the Court’s treatment of constitutional interpretation, citation to
foreign precedent may also be increasing in the context of treaty interpretation. Even Justice Scalia, generally a stalwart critic of applying
foreign authority in the constitutional context, acknowledges the utility of foreign precedent when the Court interprets treaties.35 Therefore, though the Supreme Court manifests a similar reluctance toward
using foreign precedent when interpreting treaties as it does when
interpreting the Constitution, the Court may be more amenable to
such precedent in the treaty context.
C. The International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice is the “principal judicial organ” of the United Nations36 and is considered the most prominent
international court.37 Though all U.N. member states are automatically parties to the ICJ,38 four distinct bases of jurisdiction exist: (1) by
both parties’ explicit consent,39 (2) as stipulated by the U.N. Charter
or by treaty,40 (3) by a state’s formal consent to compulsory jurisdiction,41 and (4) by any declarations made during the existence of the
30
See 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (referencing and quoting
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination to
demonstrate a common international understanding regarding affirmative action).
31
See 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (noting the “world community” opinion on the
execution of mentally retarded persons).
32
See 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005).
33
See id.
34
See Van Alstine, supra note 10, at 1929.
35
See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“We can, and should, look to decisions of other signatories when we interpret treaty provisions. Foreign constructions are evidence of the original shared understanding of the contracting parties.”).
36
Karamanian, supra note 9, at 745.
37
See MARTIN & WILSON, supra note 2, at 21 (“The most prominent UN Charter-based
court is the International Court of Justice in The Hague.”); Eric A. Posner, Transnational
Legal Process and The Supreme Court’s 2003–2004 Term: Some Skeptical Observations, in
12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 23, 32 (2004) (“The ICJ is the most prominent and prestigious of the international courts . . . .”).
38
U.N. Charter art. 93, para. 1 (“All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto
parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.”), available at http://
www.un.org/aboutun/charter.
39
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, para. 1, June 25, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
40
See id.
41
See id. at para. 2.
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Permanent Court of International Justice.42 Though the court’s rulings are not directly binding on member states,43 each state must “undertake[ ] to comply with the decision of the International Court of
Justice in any case to which it is a party.”44 The United States originally accepted the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction in 1946 but withdrew
its acceptance in 1985 after the court rejected the United States’ jurisdictional objections in Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua.45 The United States, however, may still consent to the ICJ’s
jurisdiction over certain matters, such as when it ratifies a treaty’s optional protocol.46
II
THE VIENNA CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC
INTERNATIONAL COURTS

AND

A. History of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, a codification of
then-existing customary international law on consular relations, governs the relations between a nation’s citizens and its consul.47 The
preamble to the Vienna Convention states that the Convention fosters
diplomacy and consular relations in an effort to “contribute to the
development of friendly relations among nations, irrespective of their
differing constitutional and social systems.”48 More specifically, Article 36 mandates that receiving states must notify foreign nationals—
upon arrest—of their right to contact their national consul.49 Article
42
See id. at para. 5. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was the
predecessor to the ICJ. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
677–78 (6th ed. 2003). Article 37 of the ICJ statute also transfers all authority from the
PCIJ to the ICJ. ICJ Statute, supra note 39, art. 37. The court may also issue advisory
opinions. See BROWNLIE, supra, at 690–92.
43
See MURPHY, supra note 1, at 130.
44
U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1, quoted in MURPHY, supra note 1, at 130.
45
See MURPHY, supra note 1, at 134–35.
46
For example, until March 2005 the United States was a party to the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, art. 1, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 (entered into force
for United States Dec. 24, 1969) [hereinafter Optional Protocol]. See Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2675 (2006). This gave the ICJ jurisdiction over the United States
regarding disputes over the Vienna Convention’s interpretation or application. See Optional Protocol, art. 1, 596 U.N.T.S. at 487.
47
See Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Search
for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 565, 612 (1997).
48
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations pmbl., Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 79,
596 U.N.T.S. 261, 262.
49
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations states in full:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating
to nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the
sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State
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36 also provides that the laws and regulations of a receiving state
“must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights
accorded under [Article 36] are intended.”50 The United States,
along with 169 other nations, has signed and ratified the treaty.51 For
the purposes of U.S. law, the Vienna Convention is a self-executing
treaty.52
Due to the important subject matter of Article 36, its international legal force is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.53
The United States has voiced no reservations to the Convention and
no state has repudiated it.54 The United States will most likely not
withdraw from the treaty, as it provides crucial protection for U.S. diplomats abroad.55 Furthermore, because virtually all Vienna Convention cases involve the post-arrest failure to notify a foreign national of
the rights that Article 36 creates, it is unlikely that the facts of a new
case would disturb the current doctrines.56 Lastly, the U.S. government has already recognized the importance of implementing and
supporting the Convention’s underlying policy of providing foreign
shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within
its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any
communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in
prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities
without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also
have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison,
custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such
action.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State,
subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under this Article are intended.
Id. art. 36, 21 U.S.T. at 100–01, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292–94.
50
Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
51
See Asa Markel, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: After the Federal Courts’
Abdication, Will State Courts Fill in the Breach?, 7 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 3 (2007).
52
See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 91-9, at 5 (1969) (statement of J. Edward Lyerly, Deputy Legal
Adviser for Administration) (stating that the Vienna Convention is self-executing and requires no domestic implementing legislation).
53
See Leading Cases, supra note 12, at 310–11.
54
See id.
55
See id.
56
See id.
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defendants with consular notification.57 These considerations suggest
that the Vienna Convention is and will continue to be an integral part
of American law and underscore the importance of the Supreme
Court’s treatment of this treaty.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention on Treaties), another codification of customary international
law,58 governs the standards to which states must adhere when interpreting and upholding treaty obligations.59 Under this Convention, a
state “may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty.”60 The Vienna Convention on Treaties also sets forth a rule of “pacta sunt servanda,” under which every
state party to a treaty must act in good faith.61 Although the United
States has never ratified the Vienna Convention on Treaties, it remains incredibly influential, and international tribunals accept it as a
reflection of customary international practice.62
B. The Vienna Convention in Modern Case Law
Despite its age,63 the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
has been the subject of a surprisingly large number of judicial decisions within the past decade. The modern case law—both in the U.S.
Supreme Court and in the ICJ—begins with Breard v. Greene.64 In
Breard, the police arrested a Paraguayan citizen, and a jury ultimately
convicted him of murder.65 The police never informed him of his
Vienna Convention right to consular access, and he did not raise his
claims at any point during trial, appeal, or state habeas corpus proceedings.66 The court denied the federal habeas petition that Breard
57

See id.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties pmbl., May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 332, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/
1_1_1969.pdf (indicating the signatories’ intent that the Convention serve as a codification
of existing customary international law of treaties). For clarity in this Note, all references
to the “Vienna Convention” refer to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, not the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
59
See Kadish, supra note 47, at 590–92; Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of International Law or Its Fragmentation?, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 929, 951 (2004) (“[T]he Vienna Convention on Law of
Treaties . . . represents the codification of customary international law and is therefore
binding on all States.”).
60
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 58, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. at
339.
61
Id. art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339; see also Kadish, supra note 47, at 591 n.164 (describing the pacta sunt servanda rule).
62
See MURPHY, supra note 1, at 66 & n.5.
63
The the parties signed the Convention in 1963, and the United States ratified it in
1969. See Kadish, supra note 47, at 568.
64
523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam).
65
See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 26, at 295.
66
See id.
58
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eventually filed, prompting Paraguay to file an ICJ suit against the
United States.67 The ICJ unanimously stated that the United States
should “take all measures at its disposal” to prevent Breard’s execution before any ICJ ruling, and Breard and Paraguay subsequently
brought suit in the U.S. Supreme Court.68 However, less than an hour
before Breard’s execution, the Court held that “nothing in [its] existing case law” allowed it to overrule the Virginia Governor’s choice
not to stay the execution.69 When considering the ICJ, the Court
stated:
[W]hile we should give respectful consideration to the interpretation of
an international treaty rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret such, it has been recognized in international
law that, absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the
procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of
the treaty in that State.70

Virginia executed Breard that evening, and Paraguay subsequently
dropped its suit.71
Just a year later, in Germany v. United States, the Court once again
grappled with applying the Vienna Convention.72 In that case, the
police arrested the LaGrand brothers, two German citizens, for murder and other crimes related to bank robbery but did not inform
them of their Vienna Convention rights at the time of arrest.73 After
both brothers received death sentences and sought to overturn them,
reviewing courts invoked procedural default rules to foreclose any collateral attack.74 After the state executed the first brother, Germany
brought suit in the ICJ, seeking provisional measures to delay the second execution pending a final decision by the ICJ.75 Just as in Breard,
the ICJ granted provisional measures requesting that the United
States “take all measures at its disposal” to suspend the execution.76
Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court denied that such rulings of the

67
See id. The ICJ had jurisdiction over the United States because it had ratified the
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. See Optional Protocol, supra note 46, art. 1, 596 U.N.T.S. at
487.
68
See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 26, at 295.
69
See Breard, 523 U.S. at 378; DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 26, at 296.
70
Breard, 523 U.S. at 375 (emphasis added).
71
See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 26, at 297–98.
72
See Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999).
73
See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 26, at 298.
74
See id.
75
See id. In ICJ proceedings, provisional measures are a form of interim relief similar
to a preliminary injunction. See id. at 295.
76
See id. at 298.
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ICJ constituted a binding legal order,77 and the state executed the
second brother.78
Unlike in Breard, however, Germany persisted in its suit before
the ICJ.79 In the ICJ’s LaGrand judgment, the court declared in
sweeping language that individuals’ Article 36 rights were not only an
individual right but had “assumed the character of a human right.”80
As a threshold matter, the court held that its provisional measures
were “binding in character and created a legal obligation for the
United States.”81 It criticized the United States federal government
and Supreme Court for what it saw as a perfunctory attempt at enforcing the ICJ’s Germany v. United States decision.82 The court found that
the United States had violated its treaty obligations by failing to notify
the LaGrands of their Vienna Convention rights.83 The ICJ’s reasoning rested in part upon a determination that the United States’ procedural default rule effectively prohibited domestic courts from
“attaching any legal significance” to its treaty obligations.84 In essence, the court held that the rule prevented the “full effect” that the
Vienna Convention requires and, therefore, violated paragraph 2 of
Article 36.85
The ICJ’s next ruling, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals,86 provided the court with a full opportunity for exposition
of its views on the Vienna Convention. In 2003, Mexico filed suit
against the United States in the ICJ on behalf of fifty-four Mexican
nationals on death row in the United States.87 Mexico alleged that, in
all cases, the state never informed the convicts of their Vienna Convention rights and requested ICJ provisional measures before the ICJ’s
final ruling.88 Additionally, Mexico requested that the ICJ rule on the
U.S. procedural default rules that had previously barred other foreign
nationals’ Vienna Convention claims.89 After ordering provisional
measures,90 the ICJ held that the United States had breached its obligations and that it should “permit review and reconsideration of [the]
77

See Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. at 111–12.
See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 26, at 298.
79
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27), available at http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/104/7736.pdf; see DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 26, at 299.
80
LaGrand Case, 2001 I.C.J. at 514.
81
Id. at 506.
82
See id. at 506–08.
83
See id. at 475–76.
84
See id. at 497–98.
85
Id. at 498.
86
See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8188.pdf.
87
See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 26, at 295.
88
See id.
89
See id.
90
See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 17, 70.
78
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nationals’ cases . . . with a view to ascertaining whether in each case
the violation of Article 36 . . . caused actual prejudice to the defendant
in the process of administration of criminal justice.”91
In 2005, in Medellı́n v. Dretke, the Supreme Court ostensibly deferred to the ICJ’s Avena ruling.92 The Court, in a five to four decision, dismissed a convict’s writ of certiorari as improvidently granted
and acknowledged that Texas courts should enforce the Avena decision.93 In a dissenting opinion, however, Justice O’Connor pointed
out that Medellı́n might, but possibly might not, obtain proper relief in
the Texas courts pursuant to a presidential memorandum pledging
that the “United States would discharge its obligations under the
Avena judgment ‘by having State courts give effect to the decision.’”94
Accordingly, Justice O’Connor believed that the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit may have wanted to consider the possibility of granting relief in light of the President’s memorandum.95 Furthermore,
Justice O’Connor even noted that “[r]easonable jurists can vigorously
disagree about whether and what legal effect ICJ decisions have in our
domestic courts.”96 This disagreement would ultimately serve as one
of the principal points of controversy in Sanchez-Llamas.
III
SANCHEZ-LLAMAS V. OREGON
A. Background Facts and Procedural History
The facts of Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon come from two cases that the
Supreme Court consolidated. In the first case, police arrested Moises
Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican national, after an exchange of gunfire injured an officer.97 At the time of arrest, police gave Sanchez-Llamas
warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona98 but did not alert him of his
right under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention to notify the Mexican
Consulate.99 During interrogation, Sanchez-Llamas made incriminat91

Id. at 59–60.
See Medellı́n v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661–62 (2005) (per curiam). The Supreme
Court has since granted certiorari in Ex parte Medellı́n, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006), cert. granted, Medellı́n v. Texas, 127 S.Ct. 2129 (2007) (No. 06-984).
93
See Medellı́n, 544 U.S. at 666–67.
94
Id. at 690 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Memorandum from President
George W. Bush to the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html).
95
See id.
96
Id. at 684.
97
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2675–76 (2006). Unlike Medellı́n,
Sanchez-Llamas was not one of the fifty-four Mexican nationals involved in the Avena
decision.
98
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
99
See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2676.
92
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ing statements to police regarding the shoot-out.100 Before trial, he
moved to suppress these statements, arguing that the police’s failure
to notify him of his Article 36 rights rendered his statements involuntary.101 The trial court denied the motion and Sanchez-Llamas eventually received a sentence of over twenty years in prison.102 Both the
Oregon Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the
conviction.103
In the second case, authorities arrested Mario Bustillo, a Honduran national, for allegedly hitting a man in the head with a baseball
bat, causing an injury that ultimately led to the victim’s death.104 Like
Sanchez-Llamas, the police never informed Bustillo of his Article 36
right to contact the Honduran Consulate.105 A jury convicted Bustillo
of first-degree murder and the judge sentenced him to thirty years in
prison.106 After an unsuccessful appeal, Bustillo filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in state court, arguing that the authorities had
violated his right to consular notification under Article 36.107 Finding
no reversible error, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the state
court’s habeas ruling that Bustillo’s claim was procedurally barred because Bustillo failed to raise the issue at trial or on appeal.108
B. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts, writing on behalf of the majority in his first
major international case, identified three key issues. First, the Court
asked whether Article 36 of the Vienna Convention “create[d] rights
that defendants may invoke against the detaining authorities in a
criminal trial or in a postconviction proceeding.”109 Second, the
Court considered whether a violation of Article 36 “require[d] suppression of a defendant’s statement to police.”110 Finally, the Court
inquired whether, in a postconviction proceeding, a state could treat a
defendant’s Article 36 claim as “defaulted because he failed to raise
the claim at trial.”111 The Court ruled that, regardless of whether Article 36 creates judicially enforceable rights, suppression is not an ap100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id.
See
See
See
See
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.
Id.

id.
id.
id.
id. Bustillo was the second petitioner in the case.

id. at 2677.
at 2674.
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propriate remedy and a state can apply its regular procedural default
rules.112
The majority never explicitly ruled on whether Article 36 creates
enforceable rights.113 Because the Court ultimately denied relief to
both Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo, it deemed it “unnecessary to resolve the question whether the Vienna Convention grants individuals
enforceable rights.”114 “[W]e assume, without deciding,” stated the
majority, “that Article 36 does grant Bustillo and Sanchez-Llamas such
rights.”115
The Court next turned to the question of suppressing a defendant’s statements.116 Sanchez-Llamas argued that the trial court
should have suppressed his confession because the police never informed him of his Article 36 rights.117 The Court first noted that the
plain language of the Vienna Convention provides no remedies for
Article 36 violations but instead leaves such a decision to domestic
judgment: Article 36 rights “are to ‘be exercised in conformity with
the laws and regulations of the receiving State.’”118 Also, given the
unique nature of the American exclusionary rule, the Court deemed
it “implausible” that other Vienna Convention signatories would have
recognized suppression as a remedy for violations.119 The Court then
observed that it had no supervisory authority over the state courts and,
therefore, could not compel suppression.120 According to the Court,
any such authority should stem from the Vienna Convention itself so
as not to impermissibly “enlarg[e] the obligations of the United States
under the Convention.”121
Additionally, the Court observed that the application of the suppression remedy is extremely rare122—limited to exceptional constitutional cases, specifically those in which statutory violations “implicated
important Fourth and Fifth Amendment interests.”123 In contrast, according to the majority, the Vienna Convention remains “at best remotely connected” to evidence gathering, and the common rationales
for suppression found in the context of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
112

Id.
See id. at 2677–78.
114
Id. at 2677.
115
Id. at 2677–78.
116
See id. at 2678–82.
117
Id. at 2678.
118
Id. (quoting Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 48, art. 36, 21
U.S.T. at 100–01, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292–94).
119
See id.
120
See id. at 2679 (“‘It is beyond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory power over
the courts of the several States.’” (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438
(2000))).
121
See id.
122
See id. at 2680.
123
See id. at 2681.
113
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violations are “entirely absent from the consular notification context.”124 Lastly, the Court noted that alternative means exist for protecting and enforcing Vienna Convention rights, and therefore
“neither the Vienna Convention itself nor . . . precedents applying the
exclusionary rule support suppression of Sanchez-Llamas’ statements
to police.”125
Finally, the Court considered the issue of procedural default. Applying Breard-like “respectful consideration,” the majority held that
state procedural default rules still apply in the context of an Article 36
violation.126 In doing so, the Court first noted that its “general rule”
in habeas cases is that “a defendant who fails to raise a claim on direct
appeal is barred from raising the claim on collateral review.”127 An
exception to this procedural default rule arises when “a defendant can
demonstrate both ‘cause’ for not raising the claim at trial, and
‘prejudice’ from not having done so.”128 Quoting its opinion in
Breard, the Court reasserted that “absent a clear and express statement
to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the
implementation of the treaty in that State.”129 Furthermore, the
Court reiterated that though Article 36—and treaties in general—are
federal law, so too are “provisions of the Constitution itself, to which
rules of procedural default apply.”130 Therefore, the Court reasoned
that Breard, which explicitly held that the Vienna Convention does not
trump the procedural default rule, governed in the case at hand.131
Next, the Court addressed Bustillo’s assertions that, “since Breard,
the ICJ has interpreted the Vienna Convention to preclude the application of procedural default rules to Article 36 claims” and “LaGrand
and Avena warrant revisiting the procedural default holding of
Breard.”132 In rejecting Bustillo’s argument, the Court noted that
“[a]lthough the ICJ’s interpretation deserves ‘respectful considera124
Id. (“We require exclusion of coerced confessions both because we disapprove of
such coercion and because such confessions tend to be unreliable. We exclude the fruits
of unreasonable searches on the theory that without a strong deterrent, the constraints of
the Fourth Amendment might be too easily disregarded by law enforcement. The situation
here is quite different. The failure to inform a defendant of his Article 36 rights is unlikely, with any frequency, to produce unreliable confessions. And unlike the search-andseizure context—where the need to obtain valuable evidence may tempt authorities to
transgress Fourth Amendment limitations—police win little, if any, practical advantage
from violating Article 36. Suppression would be a vastly disproportionate remedy for an
Article 36 violation.” (citations omitted)).
125
Id. at 2681–82.
126
See id. at 2682–88.
127
Id. at 2682.
128
See id.
129
Id. at 2682–83 (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam)).
130
See id. at 2683 (quoting Breard, 523 U.S. at 376).
131
See id. at 2683 & n.4.
132
Id. at 2683.
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tion,’” it did “not compel [the Court] to reconsider [its] understanding of the Convention in Breard.”133
The Court then used a distinctly domestic focus to analyze its judicial role in interpreting and applying treaty provisions:
Under our Constitution, “[t]he judicial Power of the United States”
is “vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” That “judicial Power . . . extend[s] to . . . Treaties.” And, as Chief Justice
Marshall famously explained, that judicial power includes the duty
“to say what the law is.” If treaties are to be given effect as federal
law under our legal system, determining their meaning as a matter
of federal law “is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department,” headed by the “one supreme Court” established by
the Constitution. It is against this background that the United
States ratified, and the Senate gave its advice and consent to, the
various agreements that govern referral of Vienna Convention disputes to the ICJ.134

The Court contrasted this constitutional authority with that of the ICJ:
Nothing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its interpretations were intended to be conclusive on our courts. The ICJ’s
decisions have “no binding force except between the parties and in
respect of that particular case.” Any interpretation of law the ICJ
renders in the course of resolving particular disputes is thus not
binding precedent even as to the ICJ itself; there is accordingly little
reason to think that such interpretations were intended to be controlling on our courts. The ICJ’s principal purpose is to arbitrate
particular disputes between national governments. While each
member of the United Nations has agreed to comply with decisions
of the ICJ “in any case to which it is a party,” the Charter’s procedure for noncompliance—referral to the Security Council by the
aggrieved state—contemplates quintessentially international
remedies.135

The Court’s consideration of the ICJ, therefore, stemmed from a
highly U.S.-centric conception of the Court’s obligations. In closing,
the Court stated that “La Grand and Avena are . . . entitled only to the
‘respectful consideration’ due an interpretation of an international
agreement by an international court.”136 While holding that neither
suppression nor a procedural default exception would be appropriate,
the Court concluded that it is “no slight to the Convention to deny
petitioners’ claims under the same principles [which] would apply to
133
134
135
136

Id.
Id. at 2684 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 2684–85 (footnote and citations omitted).
Id. at 2685.
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an Act of Congress, or to the Constitution itself.”137 In so holding, the
Supreme Court refused to allow Article 36 to preclude the application
of American procedural default rules.138
C. Justice Breyer’s Dissenting Opinion
Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer rejected the majority’s dismissal of the ICJ, arguing in favor of a “sometimes,” rather than
“never,” approach to deference to the ICJ.139 Justice Breyer argued
that: (1) a criminal defendant may raise a claim that state officials
violated Article 36 of the Vienna Convention,140 (2) state procedural
default rules may sometimes yield to the Vienna Convention’s requirement that states give it “full effect,”141 and (3) suppression may sometimes be an appropriate remedy.142
1. Individual Rights Under Article 36
The dissent argued that the defendants could indeed raise an Article 36 claim.143 Noting that the Vienna Convention is “self-executing,”144 the dissent reasoned that the defendants must be able to
make claims under the Vienna Convention because both the Constitution and the Court’s own case law affirm treaties as equivalent to domestic law.145 Under that rubric,146 the dissent determined that the
Vienna Convention itself sets forth “judicially enforceable” standards.147 It reasoned that Article 36 intended to create individual
rights because it explicitly refers to the “rights” of foreign nationals
137

Id. at 2687–88.
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment but dissented in part. See id. at
2688–90 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). She agreed with the dissent that Article 36 does in
fact “grant[ ] rights that may be invoked by an individual in a judicial proceeding.” Id. at
2688. Although she concurred in the judgment, she would have remanded neither
Sanchez-Llamas’s nor Bustillo’s case for further proceedings. See id. She accused the dissenting faction of stretching the facts impermissibly and argued that Sanchez-Llamas himself “scarcely resemble[d]” the dissent’s conception of an “uncomprehending detainee.”
See id.
139
See id. at 2690–709 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Souter joined Justice Breyer; Justice Ginsburg joined the dissent in part. Id. at 2690.
140
See id. at 2693–98.
141
See id. at 2698–705.
142
See id. at 2706–08.
143
Id. at 2698.
144
Id. at 2694.
145
See id. at 2694–95 (citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1884)).
146
See id. at 2695 (“[T]his court set forth [the question] in the Head Money Cases: Does
the Convention set forth a ‘law’ with the legal stature of an Act of Congress? . . . [W]e are
to answer that question by asking, does the Convention ‘prescribe a rule by which the
rights of the private citizen . . . may be determined’? Are the obligations set forth in Article
36(1)(b) ‘of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice’?” (second omission in original)
(quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598–99)).
147
See id.
138

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050785

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\93-1\CRN107.txt

2007]

unknown

Seq: 19

19-NOV-07

“RESPECTFUL CONSIDERATION”

10:02

261

and no other Article contains such language.148 The dissent also likened the Vienna Convention to a statute and noted that courts would
have “automatically assumed” that a comparable statute created “applicable law that a criminal defendant could invoke at trial.”149 Focusing on the “respectful consideration” doctrine, the dissent argued that
true “respectful consideration” would accord an interpretation consistent with that of the ICJ.150 Finally, the dissent disagreed with the
executive branch’s interpretation that Article 36 did not create individually enforceable rights.151 The dissent noted that there is no presumption against individually enforceable rights and that, although
executive branch interpretations deserve “great weight,” they are not
conclusive.152
2. Procedural Default Rules and “Respectful Consideration”
Addressing the second, “more difficult issue,” the dissent examined the permissibility of a court setting aside a procedural default
rule where police have violated Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.153 The majority rigidly found that such a remedy would “never”
be appropriate, but the dissent argued that Article 36 required a “less
absolute answer.”154 The dissent explained that the plain language of
the Vienna Convention showed that, although individual rights “shall
be exercised in conformity with” the host country’s laws, such laws
must also “enable full effect to be given.”155 The dissent also explained that the Convention’s drafting history demonstrated that the
framers intentionally prioritized the “full effect” language and rejected language that would have merely required that state laws “not
nullify” the Convention’s rights.156
148
See id. (noting language that suggests specific elements of the right of a foreign
national who is arrested or detained).
149
Id. The dissent also cited numerous instances where the Court had permitted individuals to enforce treaty provisions, noting that in all such cases, the Court recognized that
(1) a treaty “obligated the United States to treat foreign nationals in a certain manner,” (2)
the Government’s conduct had breached the obligation, and (3) the foreign national
could seek redress for that breach, even though the treaty did not specifically mention
judicial enforcement or expressly state that it conferred rights. Id. at 2696.
150
See id. at 2696–97. Though Justice Breyer states this conclusion about “respectful
consideration” when discussing enforceable rights, he does so at much greater length
when discussing remedies for Vienna Convention violations. See id. at 2699–701.
151
See id. at 2697–98.
152
See id. (citing Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85
(1982)).
153
See id. at 2698–705.
154
Id. at 2698.
155
Id. (quoting Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 48, art. 36, 21
U.S.T. at 100–01, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292–94).
156
See id. at 2698–99. According to records of the meetings, proponents of this
change argued that “nullify” would mean to “render completely inoperative” and that
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Notably, the dissent’s own “respectful consideration” of the ICJ
served as its final reason for setting aside state procedural default
rules.157 Justice Breyer noted that, according to both LaGrand and
Avena, state procedural default rules do not themselves violate the Vienna Convention.158 Instead, procedural default rules only violate the
Vienna Convention where government officials’ failure to notify has
precluded a defendant from being able to raise the issue of a Vienna
Convention violation.159
The dissent conceded that the ICJ rulings in LaGrand and Avena
were not binding but asserted that the Supreme Court nevertheless
owed them “respectful consideration.”160 In support of this deference, Justice Breyer noted the importance of uniformity in treaty interpretation.161 He noted that the ICJ is “specifically charged with the
duty to interpret numerous international treaties” and, therefore,
“provides a natural point of reference for national courts seeking that
uniformity.”162 Justice Breyer also recognized the ICJ’s “expertise in
matters of treaty interpretation” and observed that the Supreme Court
has “repeatedly looked to the ICJ for guidance” in interpreting treaties.163 He concluded that the Court’s interpretation stands in direct
conflict with the language, history, and ICJ interpretation of the Vienna Convention164 and is, thus, “unprecedented.”165
Justice Breyer then directly confronted the majority’s reasoning.
First, he addressed the argument that respectful consideration does
not require the Court to accord with a “clearly wrong” decision.166
The dissent accused the majority of mischaracterizing the ICJ’s holding and observed that the ICJ precludes action only where a government actor’s violation of the Vienna Convention has prevented the
rights under the Convention might still be “seriously impaired without becoming completely inoperative.” See id.
157
See id. at 2699–705.
158
See id. at 2699–700.
159
See id.
160
Id. at 2700.
161
See id. (citing Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
162
Id.
163
See id. at 2700–01. Justice Breyer cited six cases in which the Court has “looked to”
the ICJ for guidance, as well as dozens of instances of similar recognition in the lower
courts. See id. at 2701 (citing United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. 89, 99–100 (1986); United
States v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 93, 107 (1985); First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 628 & n.20 (1983); United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S.
11, 69–72 (1969); United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 172 (1965); Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 61 (1957) (plurality opinion)).
164
See id. at 2702.
165
Id.
166
See id.
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defendant from bringing a claim sooner.167 Second, the dissent distinguished Breard by noting that it had addressed a federal, not a state,
procedural rule and, thus, required different treatment under the
Supremacy Clause.168 Third, the dissent argued that the “full effect”
language of Article 36(2) constitutes a “clear and express statement”
that the Vienna Convention may sometimes “trump” a procedural default rule.169 Further, Justice Breyer argues that a “clear and express
statement” in a treaty may not even be necessary to trump a domestic
procedural rule.170 Lastly, the dissent justified the differential treatment between Convention and constitutional rights because a treaty
essentially serves as a contract between nations that warrants and requires the fulfillment of certain obligations.171
Justice Breyer concluded by stating that he would remand so that
Bustillo could argue for modification of the procedural default requirements, while allowing the state courts to determine whether state
law provided an effective remedy pursuant to the Convention.172
3. Suppression of the Evidence
Addressing the final issue, Justice Breyer asserted that suppression of evidence may sometimes be an appropriate remedy.173 Though
he agreed with the majority that the Convention does not create an
“automatic exclusionary rule,” he cautioned that “[m]uch depends on
the circumstances.”174 Indeed, he noted that while Miranda rights do
help arrested foreign nationals by informing them of their right to an
attorney, such rights will not necessarily “cure” every prejudicial failure to inform them of the right to contact their consulate, so the Convention would still apply.175
Next, Justice Breyer rejected the majority’s statement that it
would be “startling” if the Vienna Convention required suppression,
arguing instead that the framers of the Convention were “fully aware
that the criminal justice systems of different nations differ in impor167
See id. The dissent also noted that, in Avena, the ICJ permitted “review and reconsideration” by domestic courts to ensure that a defendant’s failure to bring a claim resulted
from the state’s failure to inform the defendant of the Vienna Convention’s consular access rights. See id. at 2703.
168
See id. at 2703–04. The dissent further noted that Breard remained consistent with
the ICJ’s rulings and that an exception to the dissent’s general rule could be carved out for
Breard because it was a recent decision, was decided within a few hours between the filing
of a petition for certiorari and a scheduled execution, and because an exception would
only apply to language not central to the holding. See id. at 2703–05.
169
Id. at 2705.
170
See id.
171
See id.
172
See id.
173
See id. at 2706.
174
Id.
175
See id.
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tant ways.”176 He asserted that the general language of the Convention would require suppression whenever suppression offers the only
effective remedy,177 and he listed several common-law countries that
use suppression as a remedy.178 Justice Breyer conceded that civil law
systems lack suppression as a remedy but argued that the use of
greater judicial investigation in such systems tends to obviate the need
for a specific suppression remedy.179 Finally, he noted that “the absence of reported decisions formally suppressing confessions obtained
in violation of the Convention [says] nothing at all about whether
such nations give ‘full effect’ to the ‘purposes’ of Article 36(1).”180
IV
EVALUATING SANCHEZ-LLAMAS V. OREGON
As the above exposition reveals, Sanchez-Llamas underscores several legal tensions. For example, Sanchez-Llamas warrants discussion of
judicial minimalism,181 individually enforceable rights,182 division of
federal and state authority,183 conflict between constitutional and international authority,184 and even the implications for international
law in light of the appointment of the new Justices on the Roberts
Court.185 Nonetheless, such discussions fall beyond the scope of this
176

Id.
See id. at 2707.
178
See id. (citing cases from Australia and Canada).
179
See id. Civil law countries, in contrast to common law countries, focus more centrally on legislative codes that limit judges’ discretion. See John S. Baker, Jr., Citing Foreign
and International Law to Interpret the Constitution: What’s the Point?, 69 ALB. L. REV. 683, 686
(2006). Such codification is supposed to be a “complete expression of law.” Id.
180
Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2708.
181
See Leading Cases, supra note 12, at 307 (“Sanchez-Llamas is an example of judicial
minimalism: it decided a fairly narrow set of issues, and it did so without broaching the
core underlying subject, the availability of individually enforceable rights under Article
36.”).
182
See Sital Kalantry, The Intent-to-Benefit: Individually Enforceable Rights Under Treaties, 44
STAN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2007).
183
For a discussion of the interaction between American states and international law,
see Note, Too Sovereign But Not Sovereign Enough: Are U.S. States Beyond the Reach of the Law of
Nations?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2654 (2003). “[I]t should no longer be plausible for the U.S.
government to assert (as it did in a brief submitted to the Supreme Court of the United
States) that in attempting to compel state compliance with international obligations, ‘[t]he
‘measures at [the United States’] disposal’ under our Constitution may in some instances
include only persuasion.’” Id. at 2655 (alterations in original).
184
See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 26, at 293–94 (noting the inherent problems that
arise when domestic and international legal obligations conflict and discussing the “later in
time” rule as a domestic remedy). See generally Philip V. Tisne, Note, The ICJ and Municipal
Law: The Precedential Effect of the Avena and LaGrand Decisions in U.S. Courts, 29 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 865 (2006) (providing a partial history of the relevant case law, including domestic and international considerations for the Supreme Court).
185
With the departure of Justice O’Connor, the Roberts Court has notably shifted
even further away from declaring that Article 36 bestows individually enforceable rights.
The court has moved from a vote of 5-4 in Medellı́n (Justices O’Connor, Breyer, Souter, and
177
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Note, which will instead focus on one aspect of the decision: the deference that the U.S. Supreme Court should pay toward the ICJ’s interpretation of those international treaties within the ICJ’s jurisdiction.
Indeed, the case brings a renewed interest in the interactions between
the Court and the ICJ and necessitates an examination of the ongoing
emergence of the doctrine of “respectful consideration.”
A. The Function of “Respectful Consideration” in Breard and
Sanchez-Llamas
From its inception in Breard, the “respectful consideration” doctrine appeared to preclude significant deference toward the ICJ. Indeed, the Breard Court’s first mention of the concept was also its last:
its initial statement that “we should give respectful consideration to
the interpretation of [a] treaty rendered by an international court”
was immediately followed by the assertion that “procedural rules of
the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that
State.”186 The Court supported the latter statement not only with its
own precedent but also with Article 36(2)187 and continued to review
the Vienna Convention and related doctrine through its own system
of reasoning.188 The Court’s final mention of the ICJ dismisses it.189
Even the dissenting Justices fail to note the majority’s dismissal of the
ICJ and instead argue against the majority on other grounds.190
Scholars writing about Breard before Sanchez-Llamas have observed the dismissive nature of “respectful consideration.” For example, one commentator suggested that “respectful consideration”
amounted to little more than “inconsequential politeness” in Breard
and that American courts may never apply true “respectful consideration.”191 Another noted that, in Breard, the Court only “grudgingly
Stevens dissenting) to the current 6-3 vote in Sanchez-Llamas (Justices Breyer, Souter, and
Stevens dissenting). Compare Medellı́n v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005), with Sanchez-Llamas,
126 S. Ct. 2669.
186
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam).
187
See id. (“This proposition is embodied in the Vienna Convention itself, which provides that the rights expressed in the Convention ‘shall be exercised in conformity with the
laws and regulations of the receiving State,’ provided that ‘said laws and regulations must
enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
Article are intended.’” (citations omitted)).
188
See id. at 375–78.
189
See id. at 378 (“It is unfortunate that this matter comes before us while proceedings
are pending before the ICJ that might have been brought to that court earlier. Nonetheless, this Court must decide questions presented to it on the basis of law. . . . If the Governor wishes to wait for the decision of the ICJ, that is his prerogative. But nothing in our
existing case law allows us to make that choice for him.”).
190
See id. at 379–81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191
Andreas L. Paulus, From Neglect to Defiance? The United States and International Adjudication, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 783, 804 (2004) (“[T]he claim that courts ‘should give respectful
consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty rendered by an international
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acknowledged” the ICJ via respectful consideration.192 Still another
scholar remarked that such disrespect could lead to the demise of the
use of “good faith” in treaty interpretation.193 However, such scholarly articles have not devoted significant space to the “respectful consideration” doctrine, possibly because the Breard Court only used the
term once before moving on to its own reasoning. In Sanchez-Llamas,
by contrast, the majority and dissent actively applied “respectful consideration,” thus opening up the door to greater academic analysis.
Taken together, Breard and Sanchez-Llamas constitute the likely
foundation of the Court’s future jurisprudence regarding foreign precedent and treaty interpretation. At least one scholar has already argued that Chief Justice Roberts engaged in a surprising amount of
“dialogue” with the ICJ and Vienna Convention treaty partners.194
Notably, Chief Justice Roberts looked beyond the plain meaning of
the treaty and considered the views of other parties to the treaty and
the analysis of the ICJ.195 As such, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Breyer both wielded foreign precedent, but they disagreed over its
meaning and application to the issue before the Court.196 This tension indicates that the Court could still pursue either a transnationalist or nationalist formulation of “respectful consideration.” By moving
in a transnationalist direction, the Court could give true “respectful
consideration” by considering foreign authority in treaty interpretation, as even Justice Scalia seems willing to do. Alternatively, by moving in a nationalist direction, the Court could continue to invoke
“respectful consideration” to pay mere lip service to the ICJ while deciding cases as if there were no ICJ ruling at all.
B. Why the Supreme Court Owes More to the International
Court of Justice
Sanchez-Llamas is likely to provoke significant commentary, particularly from scholars who had already voiced concerns about the
Court’s nationalist formulation of “respectful consideration” toward
the ICJ.197 Others, however, have already articulated a common argucourt with jurisdiction to interpret [it]’ amounted, in practice, to an exercise in inconsequential politeness.” (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).
192
See Glashausser, supra note 27, at 68.
193
See Van Alstine, supra note 10, at 1938 (“[B]ecause the I.C.J. is the international
court of final appeal for issues within its consensual jurisdiction, the grounds for deference
to authoritative I.C.J. interpretations are particularly compelling. Failure to defer to such
interpretations means that domestic courts become active participants in direct violations
of the treaty obligations of the United States under international law.”).
194
See Waters, supra note 10, at 89.
195
See id. at 93–96.
196
See id. at 94.
197
At least one scholar, however, has suggested that Sanchez-Llamas is not nearly as
detrimental to international law as it may first appear to be. See Janet Koven Levit,
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ment against deference to the ICJ: the ICJ does not have authority to
resolve questions of municipal law in place of municipal courts. According to this argument, the ICJ only has authority to “interpret municipal law as a factual matter for the purposes of international legal
proceedings.”198 As such, the ICJ’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention is essentially “irrelevant to the task of interpreting those provisions as they exist in U.S. law.”199
Although it is clearly correct that the ICJ has no actual binding
legal authority over U.S. courts, the treaty-based nature of Sanchez-Llamas extends beyond a mere “question of authority.” Indeed, as Justice
Breyer argued, the ICJ is a “natural point of reference” for courts facing questions of treaty interpretation because it specializes in interpreting certain treaties.200 Therefore, the ICJ’s decisions warrant
more than a mere modicum of recognition—much more than the
Court’s dismissive formulation of “respectful consideration”—in order
to prevent countless potentially negative effects both domestically and
abroad.
In the Vienna Convention context, therefore, the proper legal
test should be that which Justice Breyer proffers in his dissent. As a
preliminary matter, individual defendants should be able to raise Vienna Convention violation claims because the Convention is incorporated into the Supremacy Clause and has judicially enforceable
standards. Then, state courts should sometimes be able to set aside procedural default rules if a Vienna Convention violation caused the defendant’s failure to raise the claim in a timely manner and there is no
other way for the court to provide effective relief for the violation.
Additionally, state courts could also suppress evidence in the few cases
where it is the only available remedy to cure prejudice.
This test constitutes true “respectful consideration” by both showing deference to the ICJ’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention’s
“full effect” clause and conforming to U.S. domestic law. Three reasons, outlined below, militate in favor of the dissent’s test.

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: The Glass Is Half Full, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29 (2007)
(arguing that, despite the seemingly harmful nature of the judgment to the international
legal process, the Court left ample room for state and federal courts to adjudicate Vienna
Convention claims).
198
Tisne, supra note 184, at 906–07; see also Julian G. Ku, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon:
Stepping Back from the New World Court Order, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 17, 19 (2007) (arguing that the ICJ’s judgments are not—and should never be—binding on courts unless
treaty-makers or Congress have demonstrated a “clear statement” of such an intent).
199
Tisne, supra note 184, at 907.
200
See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2700 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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1. Uniformity of Interpretation
First, the Sanchez-Llamas majority’s formulation of “respectful consideration” threatens to undermine consistent interpretation of the
Vienna Convention. Indeed, a treaty “begins its life with a single, uniform content shaped by the mutual design of the treaty parties.”201
Yet only adjudication by and deference to a single interpreting court,
such as the ICJ, can settle and preserve that uniform content. Because
the ICJ is the international “court of final appeal” for issues within its
jurisdiction, its pronouncements on treaties are compellingly authoritative.202 Thus, in the present case of the Vienna Convention, breaking from the ICJ’s interpretation constitutes a drastic departure from
any hope of “uniform content.”
Though some scholars recognize inherent variability in all treaty
interpretation, they also note a risk of total American judicial isolation.203 One commentator, for example, observes the inescapable
complications arising from treaty interpretation but also states that
“[p]rudence—not deference—suggests that before allowing an execution, waiting for the complete opinion of a juristic body with particular competence in an area would be warranted.”204 Indeed, without
an attempt to align world judicial opinions on treaty interpretation, a
lack of uniformity under the Vienna Convention seems inevitable
given the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Sanchez-Llamas.
The Vienna Convention underscores the problems that inconsistent interpretation would create. The Convention has an ICJ dispute
settlement clause that the United States and other countries agreed to
when they ratified the treaty.205 By undermining the ICJ and the consistency of its treaty interpretation, Americans abroad will lose certain
rights that the U.S. Constitution guarantees, such as the right to counsel and Miranda warnings. If two standards emerge, with the United
States advocating a lower standard, it will create a “race to the bottom”
and hurt Americans who are denied such rights.

201

Van Alstine, supra note 10, at 1937.
See id. at 1938.
203
See Glashausser, supra note 27, at 85–86 (“In interpreting international agreements,
one should keep in mind that there is no such thing as a treaty. A single document, or a
single provision, can have multiple meanings. . . . In sum, difference among interpreters
of treaties may be inevitable. Deference is inappropriate. But independence need not
spawn indifference.”).
204
Id. at 86.
205
See Optional Protocol, supra note 46, art. 1, 596 U.N.T.S. at 487 (giving compulsory
jurisdiction to the ICJ over disputes arising out of the Vienna Convention’s interpretation
or application). The United States withdrew from the protocol on March 7, 2005. See
Tisne, supra note 184, at 865 n.3.
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2. The Structure of the International Court of Justice
Second, the Court should extend more deference because the
ICJ’s structure places it in an ideal position to ensure a fair and global
administration of the Vienna Convention. Because the ICJ hears
fewer cases than the U.S. Supreme Court, it can spend several years
considering cases, which allows it to deliberate more thoroughly on
competing arguments.206 Furthermore, the fifteen judges are “persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required
in their respective countries,”207 and many were themselves former
diplomats.208 As such, they have greater awareness of the subtleties of
international treaties than a U.S. Supreme Court Justice. Additionally, the judges write their opinions in both English and French209 and
are thus far more inclined to investigate world legal opinion than is
the U.S. Supreme Court with its inevitably Anglocentric
perspective.210
In Sanchez-Llamas, the majority did not spend a significant
amount of time weighing the merits of the ICJ as a judicial system.
Though the opinion mentioned the structure of the ICJ, it did so dismissively.211 Furthermore, unlike the dissent, the majority did not
consider the added expertise of the ICJ in the area of treaty interpretation.212 This is striking because the Supreme Court often recognizes
appropriate expertise in domestic contexts, such as its traditional deference to the Federal Circuit in matters of patent litigation.213 Admittedly, the Supreme Court is charged with directly reviewing the
Federal Circuit’s decisions and has a longstanding tradition of relying
206

See Glashausser, supra note 27, at 80.
ICJ Statute, supra note 39, art. 2.
208
See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Multilevel Judicial Governance of International Trade Requires a Common Conception of Rule of Law and Justice, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 529, 536 (2007).
209
See ICJ Statute, supra note 39, art. 39.
210
See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2680–81 (2006).
211
See id. at 2684–85 (“Nothing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its
interpretations were intended to be conclusive on our courts. The ICJ’s decisions have ‘no
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.’ Any interpretation of law the ICJ renders in the course of resolving particular disputes is thus not
binding precedent even as to the ICJ itself; there is accordingly little reason to think that such
interpretations were intended to be controlling on our courts. The ICJ’s principal purpose
is to arbitrate particular disputes between national governments. While each member of
the United Nations has agreed to comply with decisions of the ICJ ‘in any case to which it is
a party,’ the [United Nations] Charter’s procedure for noncompliance—referral to the
Security Council by the aggrieved state—contemplates quintessentially international remedies.” (citations omitted)).
212
See id. at 2700–01 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
213
See, e.g., United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 464 n.11 (1988) (“Because of the
unique character of the Federal Circuit, its conclusions are entitled to special deference by
this Court. . . . Because its jurisdiction is confined to a defined range of subjects, the
Federal Circuit brings to the cases before it an unusual expertise that should not lightly be
disregarded.”).
207
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on the Federal Circuit’s expertise. The current “respectful consideration” given to the ICJ, in contrast, ignores any argument that courts
should rely on ICJ rulings due to the ICJ’s specialization and
expertise.
3. The Diplomatic Interests of the United States
Third, by applying a de facto “disrespectful consideration” doctrine, the United States endangers its interests abroad. The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, the European Parliament,
and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights have all vigorously criticized the United States for its perfunctory application of the
Vienna Convention.214 These criticisms suggest that the Supreme
Court’s application of the doctrine has harmed the United States’ reputation as a human rights leader.215 By reinforcing the dismissive formulation of “respectful consideration,” Sanchez-Llamas may further
reinforce this negative perception.
Just as importantly, the United States risks the loss of reciprocal
protection of its own nationals by failing to accord true “respectful
consideration” to treaties. The Vienna Convention states in its preamble that one of its purposes is to “contribute to the development of
friendly relations among nations.”216 Indeed, these relations have tangible effects on many Americans abroad.217 By essentially disregarding the ICJ’s declared international standards with a hollow
“respectful consideration” doctrine that engenders worldwide criticism, the Supreme Court threatens to undermine these critical relations.218 For example, in the wake of a U.S. execution of a Mexican
national who had been denied consular access, Mexican President Vi214
See Brief of Former U.S. Diplomats as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners Mario
A. Bustillo and Moises Sanchez-Llamas at 12–13, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct.
2669 (2006) (Dec. 22, 2005) (Nos. 05-51 and 04-10566).
215
See id. at 13; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Restoring America’s Human Rights Reputation, 40 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 635 (2007) (discussing the ways in which the current war on
terror has undermined the United States’ human rights policies).
216
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 48, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79,
596 U.N.T.S. at 262.
217
See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (concurring opinion) (“The
protections afforded by the Vienna Convention go far beyond [this] case. United States
citizens are scattered about the world—as missionaries, Peace Corps volunteers, doctors,
teachers and students, as travelers for business and for pleasure. Their freedom and safety
are seriously endangered if state officials fail to honor the Vienna Convention and other
nations follow their example.”).
218
Under the doctrine of “retorsion,” a nation may choose to disregard its treaty obligations if it believes that one of its treaty partners is also failing to uphold its obligation. See
Markel, supra note 51, at 26–27. In the Vienna Convention context, this could have consequences for Americans seeking consular assistance. See Asa W. Markel, International Law
and Consular Immunity, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Jan. 2007, at 22, 22 (“[I]f foreign nationals in the
United States are not accorded their full rights under consular law, then foreign countries
are legally justified in suspending those rights for Americans traveling abroad.”).
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cente Fox cancelled a visit to President Bush’s Texas ranch as an “unequivocal signal” of protesting the execution.219 Such dramatic
tensions could in turn undermine the United States’ attempt at securing rights of its own citizens abroad. The U.S. State Department, for
example, forcefully protested the trial of U.S. citizen Lori Berenson in
Peru, arguing that she was denied due process because she was tried
in a closed military proceeding.220 Though she was ultimately granted
a public civilian hearing, foreign countries may resist future U.S. protest if the United States does not provide appropriate remedies for
violations of its consular obligations.
In contrast, most foreign courts have escaped this criticism by
complying with the ICJ’s Vienna Convention interpretation and its orders to remedy convention violations. The dissent in Sanchez-Llamas
noted this trend, focusing particularly on common-law courts considering the suppression remedy.221 For example, in Tan Seng Kiah v.
The Queen, an Australian criminal court held that suppression was appropriate when police failed to notify a foreign national of a statutory
right to contact a consulate.222
One way to minimize discord in the application of the Vienna
Convention among diverse legal systems is to expressly allow for and
embrace minor variations among countries’ administration of treaties.223 The European Court of Human Rights, for example, has developed a “margin of appreciation” doctrine that allows for
“reasonable deviation” in domestic implementation of human rights
obligations.224 In the Vienna Convention context, the Supreme Court
could ensure reciprocity by similarly creating a “margin of appreciation” framework for state courts. Such a balance would not only signal
the United States’ commitment to its treaty obligations but also balance the United States’ own laws with its international obligations.

219
See Brian Knowlton, Fox echoes world on the death penalty: Execution pits Mexico against
U.S., INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 16, 2002, at 1, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/
2002/08/16/death_ed3_.php?page=1.
220
See Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1451–52
(2002).
221
See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2707 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“[T]here are several cases from common-law jurisdictions suggesting that suppression is
an appropriate remedy for a Convention violation.”).
222
See Tan Seng Kiah v. The Queen, (2001) 160 F.L.R. 26 (Austl. Crim. App. N. Terr.).
223
See Glashausser, supra note 27, at 33–34.
224
See id. The “margin of appreciation” doctrine “expressly contemplates that international treaty obligations originating from a unitary text may be interpreted in different
ways in different states.” Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPs
Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 357, 404
(1998).
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C. “Respectful Consideration” After Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon
Now that the Supreme Court has twice employed “respectful consideration” when discussing ICJ decisions, it leaves open the question
of how the Court should apply the doctrine in the future, especially in
contexts other than that of the Vienna Convention. Indeed, any future cases that involve the ICJ will almost certainly accord “respectful
consideration” per Breard and Sanchez-Llamas. However, because the
Court has not explicitly fleshed out the steps required for “respectful
consideration,” it leaves open the possibility of greater future deference toward the ICJ.
Justice Breyer’s dissent, as the superior test for Vienna Convention violations, provides a possible blueprint for Supreme Court “respectful consideration.” First, the Court can look to the plain text and
drafting history of the treaty itself in order to formulate a tentative
interpretation of its meaning. Second, the Court can compare this
reading to that of the ICJ, noting specifically the ICJ’s interpretation
of the treaty as it applies in the United States and other countries.
Third, the Court can consider other factors, such as the history of the
United States’ ratification of the treaty or the ICJ’s particular expertise
in certain matters, to either give greater or less weight to the ICJ’s
interpretation. This review process will usually include a consideration of both U.S. Supreme Court and lower court case law to better
understand American courts’ past treatment of the ICJ. Finally, the
Court will compare its interpretation with that of the ICJ and, absent a
“clearly wrong” ICJ interpretation, make a good faith attempt to comply with the ICJ’s interpretation within the particular domestic procedural or substantive framework.
There are many advantages to this robust form of “respectful consideration.” First, it ensures that the Court simultaneously engages in
its own textual analysis of a treaty and recognizes the treaty as an integral part of U.S. law. Second, it avoids the Sanchez-Llamas majority’s
cursory treatment of the ICJ’s authority by always considering the factors that could militate in favor of the ICJ’s previous treaty interpretations. In doing so, it will ensure that the Court does not overlook
certain issues of national importance, such as foreign treatment of
U.S. citizens abroad.
Most importantly, this true “respectful consideration” test would
ensure a future transnationalist trajectory for the Court. As noted previously, the Court will increasingly face foreign and international decisions as it decides various matters of law. This framework would
provide a useful procedure for navigating the complex intersection of
domestic and foreign law.
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CONCLUSION
As legal systems continue to integrate in a globalizing world, U.S.
courts will increasingly face divergent domestic and international obligations. Though the International Court of Justice does not assert any
formal authority over the U.S. Supreme Court, its mounting influence
over a variety of international legal matters should cause the Court to
heavily weigh the ICJ’s decisions. Yet today, the Court’s emerging
doctrine of “respectful consideration” appears to be a judicial tool for
creating an ever-wider schism between the Court and the legal standards of the international community.
Indeed, the Court’s current formulation of “respectful consideration” constitutes little more than a hollow front from the perspective
of the international legal community. The Sanchez-Llamas dissent correctly asserts that applying true “respectful consideration” to the ICJ’s
interpretation would both foster uniformity—“an important goal of
treaty interpretation”—and acknowledge the ICJ’s “expertise in matters of treaty interpretation.”225 In contrast, the majority opinion undermines these goals, risking reciprocal treatment of Americans
abroad and hinting at future Roberts Court defiance toward international precedent in the treaty interpretation context.
At this time, however, the “respectful consideration” doctrine still
has great potential to move in a transnationalist direction. By even
considering the ICJ and its interpretation of the Vienna Convention,
the Court has already engaged in transnational dialogue. By fleshing
out “respectful consideration” with true deference in the future, the
Supreme Court can ensure a jurisprudence that is not only consistent
with domestic law but also fully complies with the United States’ international legal obligations.

225

Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2700–01.
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